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In the context of discussing the philosophy of religion generalIy and natural
theology particularly, Elliott Sober, in his Core Questions in Philosophy, devotes a
lecture to Blaise Pascal. Pascal, the brilliant seventeenth-century French
philosopher and mathematician, died at thirty-nine, not having completed his
book in progress. The work was to be a Christian apologetic, a rational defense
of the faith. What we have in the Pensees is a COlIection of notes that Pascal had
been intending to use to write the book that was not completed before Pascal's
premature death. Nonetheless, a careful reading of these remarkable notes
reveals a thinker deeply engaged in questions concerning the human condition.
They canvass evidence for the faith, the nature of rationality, and the limits of
reason. The Pensees is a classic, yet nothing more than a COlIection of notes for
the book Pascal never finished. One can only imagine what the final result might
have looked like.
Sober's generally excellent and widely popular introductory text on
philosophy is used in countless beginning philosophy courses, and so his
treatment of Pascal is perhaps the only exposure to this brilIiant thinker that
many colIege students wilI ever have. It is therefore discouraging to see that,
despite Pascal's impeccable credentials as a Christian philosopher and religious
thinker, Sober's treatment of Pascal is summarized in a chapter entitled "Pascal
and Irrationality." Sober begins the chapter by writing that Pascal was interested
in the question of whether it could be rational to believe in God even if one
thinks that it is enormously improbable that God exists. Admittedly, Pascal's
Wager may have an implication pertaining to that question, but that is little
evidence to believe that this indeed was an issue Pascal was much interested in.
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What makes it unlikely that this was Pascal's concern is that Pascal surely did not
think that the preponderance of evidence weighed against the specifically Christian or
generally theistic hypothesis. To the (unlikely) extent that Pascal was concerned with
such a question, he was entertaining what he considered a quite imaginary
hypothetical. Sober neglects to mention this. Indeed, to the contrary, he adds to the
misimpression that Pascal himself may have considered the religious hypothesis in
question to be without evidential support, and he does so in a few ways. He casts
Pascal as advancing only the Wager: a purely prudential and non-evidential argument
for believing that Cod exists. Believe in Cod or else' Sober treats the Wager merely as
a threat that would retain its force even in the absence of any evidence for the theistic
hypothesis. ' He makes no mention of any other philosophical contributions in Pascal's
thought or the Pensees. Readers of Sober unfamiliar with Pascal would naturally be led
to believe that Pascal's sole contribution is the Wager. Since the Wager potentially works
even if no evidence for Cod's existence can be adduced at all, Sober takes this to mean
that Pascal's intention was to underscore that particular implication of the Wager.
Numerous comments of Sober's in this lecture- not to mention the title of the
chapter itself'-bear out this point. As the chapter proceeds, for example, Sober explains
what a prudential reason to believe something would be like. If I promise you a million
dollars for believing that the president is juggling candy bars right now, and tell you that
if you do not get yourself to believe the proposition I will impal e you with a
toothbrush, you have a prudential reason to believe it. That is the sense in which you
have a reason to believe the proposition, but of course this is not any sort of evidential
reason. "You haven't one shred of evidence that the proposition is true. Let's describe
this fact by saying that you don't have an evidential reason for believing the proposition
in question."2 Sober then employs this analogy to talk about the Wager'
Pascal's Wager is intended to provide you with a prudential reason for believing
that Cod exists even if you think there is no evidence that there is a Cod. Even
if you think all the evidence is against the existence of Cod, Pascal thinks he can
give you a prudential reason for theism, so long as you grant that the existence
of Cod is at least possible.)
The candy bar analogy hints that Cod's likelihood is about as great as Ceorge W juggling
Snickers. Sober seems to consider both propositions unlikely and short on evidence, and
perhaps even propositions against which we could adduce a great deal of evidence.
This is not be the first time Sober employs a strategic analogy with theism. Those
familiar with his text may recall his Only Came in Town fallacy This is the fallacy of
thinking we are obliged to accept an explanation for a particular phenomenon just
because it is the only explanation so far proffered. At key junctures when Sober wants
to underscore the implausibility of theism he raises the specter of this fallacy For
instance, a few chapters before the Pascal lecture, Sober writes the following, in
answer to the question of whether one ought to accept the theological explanation for
patterns of reproduction in the absence of a better explanation by science:
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Recall the anecdote from Lecture 3. If you and I are sitting in a cabin and hear
noises in the attic, it is easy to formulate an explanation of those noises. I suggest
the noises are due to gremlins bowling. This hypothesis has the property that if it
were true, it would explain why we heard the noises. But this fact about the
gremlin hypothesis doesn't mean that the hypothesis is plausible.4
From this Sober concludes that, by parity of reasoning, we should rest content simply to
admit that at present we do not understand pattems of reproduction. Rather than giving
up and opting for the theological explanation, we should be patient enough to endure
what is likely to be only temporary ignorance until science gives us the explanation.
The implicit mutual exclusivity of theological and scientific explanations in Sober's
analysis betrays that, contrary to Sober's claim in that chapter that evolution as he was
construing it was neutral on the question of theism, science's success at providing
explanations was increasingly rendering theism obsolete and explanatorily idle. s
Perhaps on an epistemic par with bowling gremlins. Science construed as inherently at
odds with theism would constitute what William James would have called sdentism, a
sort of hyperfaith in science's ability to answer every imaginable question. (One thinks
of the recent scientist who claimed to have a scientific explanation for the creation of
the universe from nothingJ This gremlin analogy is what is most instructive here.
Notice that a proposition about bowling gremlins is not just lacking in evidential
support, but is a proposition against which an impressive array of evidence can be
adduced. It is, by design, a patently silly notion. So of course if it were the only theory
on the table, it would be rational to wait for a more acceptable alternative to come
along. To think otherwise is to reason fallaciously.
This elucidation of the Only Game in Town fallacy conceals an important fact.
What makes such reasoning fallacious is not just the decision to accept the only
theory available, but doing so when the theory in question is, at best, minimally
supported by evidence, patently absurd at worst. Suppose we were to alter the
analogy for a moment. Imagine that we are at the cabin and hear the noises in the
attic. Having been there before, you surmise it is neighbor kids who you happen to
know like to sneak in and go play in the attic. I may not know about those kids, but
once I hear the hypothesis I would be well within my epistemic rights to infer that
that is the best explanation, despite that it is the only explanation in the offing. That
one accepts the only theory on the table is not automatically flawed reasoning. That I
may not be obligated to accept it hardly entails that I am obligated to reject it. When
the example is bowling gremlins, though, the subtle slide seems persuasive from
permission to refrain from accepting a proposition to an obligation to reject it. That
Sober employs an analogy between bowling gremlins and theism is a maneuver that
many thoughtful theists would naturally resist. If Sober himself personally believes that
theism and gremlins are on an epistemic par, that is of course his prerogative. It is
surely not the opinion of all intelligent philosophers. For many, the plausibility of
theism seems much greater, inclining them to display considerably more openness
than Sober does, despite the lipservice he pays to the importance of such openness, to
theistic explanations of phenomena not otherwise plausibly explained or explainable.
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What Sober's penchant for epistemically uncharitable analogies with theism goes to
show is probably Sober's own skepticism, but he needs to be careful not to project the
appearance that Pascal himself shared such skepticism. Pascal was, of course, not
uninfluenced by skeptical thought, but a careful reading of the Pensees makes clear that he
hardly considered theism implausible or irrational. The notes constitutive of the Pensees
were being compiled for the purpose of an expansive, comprehensive Christian
apologetic. To suggest, even implicitly, that Pascal was preoccupied with the matter of
constructing an argument to believe even if there is no evidence for God's existence
borders the disingenuous. It is not an uncommon treatment of Pascal by philosophers
acquainted only with his Wager, but it is a woefully inadequate and unrepresentative
treatment of Pascal's philosophical work. 6 By delimiting one's presentation of Pascal to
two pages from the Pensees and then not disabusing the reader from believing that a mere
inadvertent implication of the Wager constitutes Pascal's central preoccupation is just poor
analysis. Whatever pedagogical benefits such an approach features pale in the light of the
disservice to and skewed representation of Pascal.
There is room for some plausible deniability by Sober on nearly all my charges
here. He does not explicitly say that Pascal was only involved in advancing the Wager;
he does not insist that Pascal himself believed there to be no evidence for theism
generally or Christianity particularly. No, the lack of troublesome logical implications
leaves room for deniability; however, Sober's implicatures are undeniable.
Communication takes place between the lines, not just by straightforward assertion.
For instance, later in the lecture Sober writes, "Pascal aimed to provide a prudential
reason, not an evidential reason ." Sober might insist that, contextually considered,
such a statement clearly refers to the Wager, which is never explicitly claimed to be
the only aspect of Pascal's writing. However, it is obvious that introductory students
unfamiliar with Pascal would naturally take Sober's statement to mean that Pascal was
unconcerned with evidential matters. That no primary selections from Pascal involving
his evidential considerations are included in Sober's book lessens the likelihood that
such misimpressions will be corrected. The number of students who heed Sober's
bibliography at the end of the section and actually look at Pascal's words for
themselves are probably few and far between.
Pascal aimed to provide in the Pensees ever so many evidential reasons to believe in
God's existence and the truth of Christianity. Among them were arguments to show
Christianity's appeal to people in all sorts of different cultural situations and Christianity's
ability to account for both the greatness and the wretchedness of man. Pascal took Jesus'
miracles and fulfillment of prophecies as effective indications of the authenticity of his
claims. Pascal also gave an argument that echoes C.S. Lewis's famous Trilemma
argument. The way Pascal put it, it's altogether unlikely that the Apostles who attested to
the historicity of Christ's resurrection were either deceived or deceivers.
Despite these arguments and many others that Pascal thought could be deployed
for arguing for the truth of Christianity, Pascal also happened to be acutely aware of
reason's limitations. Faith for Pascal was a way of knowing that was supernaturally
inspired. Faith was not contrary to reason, but it exceeds reason in terms of the
certainty it is able to confer. Take the efforts of natural theology, the cosmological,

Pascal

71

teleological, or ontological proofs of God's existence, for example. These philosophical
arguments, Pascal writes, "are so far removed from man' s reasoning, and so
complicated, that they have little force. When they do help some people it is only at
the moment when they see the demonstration. An hour later they are afraid of having
made a mistake.'" Few theists' genuine faith is primarily rooted in such metaphysical
proofs anyway. Moreover, it seems unlikely that God is primarily measuring people's
philosophical acumen or argumentative prowess when he separates the sheep from
the goats at the eschaton-as if heaven were a reward for thinking through
implications of an S5 modal logic or the principle of sufficient reason.
Pascal's sensitivity to reason's limitations led him once to ask whether probability
was itself probable, a question that practically serves as a precursor to Hume's
problem of induction. Influenced by his famous elder French contemporary, Pascal
also saw clearly reason's inability to establish with Cartesian certainty that we are not
dreaming right now. Pascal's use of reason enabled him to identify reason's limitations,
which naturally led him to infer that reason is not everything. That reason is not
everything, however, hardly entails that reason is nothing, or that Pascal can rightly be
taken as a paradigmatic irrationalist. That Pascal was no strong rationalist does not
mean he was a fideist. That he was not Aquinas did not make him Tertullian. Pascal's
sometimes cryptic and obscurantist way of expressing his thoughts in what has to be
remembered were the notes of the Pensees, if exploited and removed from context,
can make it seem like he was denying reason altogether. A fair reading reveals this
simply was not the case. He characterized as an excess not only "allowing only
reason," but also" excluding reason."s "Reason's last step is to recognize that there is an
infinite number of things which surpass it. It is simply feeble if it does not go as far as
realizing that."9 Pascal could sense reason's inability to confer Cartesian certainty,
induction's inability to be noncircularly established, and that imagination sometimes
dwarfed even the most solidly grounded reason. Reason was important for Pascal, but
it could fail to provide even the most basic answers to our questions, and "if natural
things surpass it, what will we say about supernatural things 7 " IO
So the suggestion that Pascal's Wager, taken in isolation, can adequately summarize
Pascal is simply farfetched. Justice can not even be done to the Wager itself when it is
taken in isolation. Doing so invariably tempts the reader of Pascal to interpret the Wager
in the crassest of fashions. Deploying his insights as a mathematician, Pascal had the
insight that there was an infinity and eternity to lose if we did not align our lives correctly
to the ultimate reality. As Sober puts it with maximal crassness, if "you don't believe there
is a God," and there is one, "Pascal says you suffer an infinite punishment- you receive
eternal damnation."11 Surely the potential loss of an infinite good of an ethically promising
kind is a relevant consideration for someone who might be genuinely teetering between
alternatives like theism and atheism and if, as Pascal suggests, reason alone is insufficient
to conclusively settle the matter evidentially. God's existence and whether or not this life
is all there is makes a huge difference to the way we ought to live and do our philosophy.
As Pascal wrote, "There can be no doubt that whether the soul is mortal or immortal
ought to make the whole difference in ethics. And yet philosophers have drawn up their
ethics independently of this!"l2 He adds the following:
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Th e immortality of the soul is something of such vital importance to us, which
affects us so d eeply, that we would have to have lost all feeling in orde r to be
indifferent to th e truth about it. All our actions and th oughts must fo llow such
differe nt path s, according to wheth er th ere are ete rnal bl essings to ho pe for o r
no t, th at it is impossibl e to take a ste p sensibly and di scerningly except by
determining it with this point in mind, which ought to be o ur ultimate aim."

It is no t that Pasca l thought th e ism was unlike ly but we had be tte r cove r o ur
cos mi c rea r e nd s a nyway, but rathe r that thei sm was like ly tru e and that it had
re ma rkable implications tha t need to be seriously rec ko ned with. His point abo ut
reaso n's inability to settle the matter is not th at th e ism is o bj ective ly unli kely o r
evidentially unsuppo rted, but that o ur decision on this matter is less a matter of being
rigid and strict evidentialists and mo re a matte r of respo nding to an invitatio n to a
re latio nship. Love rs d o no t issue ca ll s to be li eve in the ir existence a nd be good
evidentialists, but rather to enter into a holi stically intimate relati o nship by wooing
their beloved's heart and mind both. The principled reason, Pascal seems to suggest,
that Cod does not ove rwhelm our intellect with light o r coerce o ur will by fl ooding us
with undeniable evidence is that he wants to gently woo o ur hearts and appeal to
more than mere ly o ur intellect. "Cod wants to motivate the will mo re than the mi nd.
Absolute clarity would be mo re use to th e mind and would not help the will."" The
suggestio n that Pasca l himself would insist that m ere p ropos iti onal be lief in Cod's
existence suffices to enter into the blessedness of heaven is radi ca lly mistaken. Pasca l's
acco un t o f reaso n's limitati o ns has everything to do w ith Cod's woo ing us mo re
ho listi cally than merely in te rms of our coming to assent to his ba re existe nce.
Pascal argues tim e and aga in that th ere is enough evidence to make religious belief
ratio nal, but no t eno ugh to make it impossibl e. "There is eno ugh light fo r those w ho
des ire to see, and e no ugh darkn ess for th ose of a contrary dispositio n."" "Th ere is
enough light to enlighten the e lect and e no ugh darkness to humble them . There is
enough darkness to blind the damned and eno ugh light to condemn them and leave
th em w ith o ut excuses."'6 Sobe r's emaciated trea tm e nt o f Pasca l gravitates to the
periphe ral and eschews the central and ineliminable. It is importa nt to let Pasca l speak
fo r himself
The prophecies, even th e miracles and proofs of o ur religio n, are not of such a
nature that they ca n be said to be absolutely convincing, but they are also such
that it ca nno t be sa id unreasonable to believe the m. So there is evidence and
obscurity, to e nlighten some and· obscure the others. Bu t the evidence is such
that it exceeds, o r at least equals, the evidence to the contrary, so that it cannot
be reaso n w hi c h d ec id es us no t to fo ll o w it. Th e re fore it can o nl y b e
concupiscence and wicked ness of heart.
N OTES

I.
William James, commenting on the Wager similarly construed in hi s famous essay
'The Will to Believe," wrote, "You probably feel that when religious fa ith expresses itself thus, in
the language of the gaming-table, it is put to its last trumps. Su rely Pascal's own personal belief
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in masses and holy water had far other springs; and this celebrated page of his is but an
argument for others, a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving
heart. We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted willfully after such a mechanical
calculation would lack the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of
the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern
from their infinite reward." James went on to argue that the only way for the Wager to have
any pull is for the option in question to have some pull on us already, that is, to be a live
option. Despite the appearance of disagreement with Pascal, James eventually demonstrated
important points of resonance with Pascal, such as recognizing the importance of willfully
choosing between important options when the evidential case is not decisive and in recognizing
that what is at stake where religion is concerned is a potential relationship, carrying with it its
own logic. C.S. Lewis, in "On Obstinacy of Belief," would echo these very themes as well.
2.
Eliott Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy: A Text with Readings, 3rd ed. (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 200 I ), p. 98.
3.
Ibid.
4.
Ibid., p. 75 .
5.
This is increasingly common among secular philosophers who treat theism as an
hypothesis that must provide the best explanation of various phenomena if we are to be
rational in believing it. Although theism can plausibly be argued to provide such explanations, a
fair number of Christian philosophers have rightly pointed out that theism is not rightly thought
of as akin to a scientific theory designed to explain the world.
6.
Pascal's philosophical contributions have also been trivialized by those who resent his
having left behind his mathematical pursuits to do religious philosophy. As E.T. Bell writes, in
Men of Mathematics, "...we shall consider Pascal primarily as a highly gifted mathematician who
let his masochistic proclivities for self-torturing and profitless speculations on the sectarian
controversies of his day degrade him to what would now be called a religious neurotic." I am
rather inclined to think that much of the same genius that led to his mathematical achievement
inspired his philosophical insight.
7
Blaise Pascal, Pensees and Other Writings, tr. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), no. 222.
8.
Ibid., no. 214.
9.
Ibid., no. 220.
10. Ibid.
II
Ibid., no. 100.
12. Ibid., no. 507
13. Ibid., no. 681
14. Ibid., no. 266. Famous atheist-turned-Deist Antony Flew was a featured guest at a
recent Oxbridge conference, a conference held in honor of C.S. Lewis . In answer to the
question of what it would take to convince him of a miracle, he cited a sort of miracle so
undeniable that nobody in their right mind could deny it. Pascal would challenge Flew to
consider that God might have principled reasons not to so radically illumine the mind with
revelation and thereby effectively coerce the will.
I 5. Ibid., no. 182. Virtually the same sentiment also in no. 274.
16. Ibid., no. 268.
17
Ibid., no. 423 .

